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SUPeR Article 
Freedom of Speech on College Campuses 
By: Martin Hooper 
Abstract 
This study is an attempt to understand why people, specifically college students, do or do 
not tolerate different forms of speech and expression. Political tolerance is the classic dependent 
variable used to measure opinion on civil liberties. Existing literature on political tolerance 
suggests that it is affected by political leanings, education, perception of opposing ideologies, and 
gender, among other things. Prior research is lacking that targets college students and that 
differentiates opinions of free speech relating to public life from opinions relating to life on a 
private campus. A survey of 522 Susquehanna University students delivered results that were used 
to analyze the relationship between an array of independent variables and several dependent 
variables relating to opinions on the regulation of speech. The results indicate that a student’s 
political affiliation, interest in politics, political sophistication, perception of racism, status as a 
victim of derogatory speech, year in school, and gender all have a significant effect on opinions 






Multiple issues involving freedom of speech are at the forefront of American political 
debate today. Specifically, on college campuses in America, conversations about political 
correctness, hate speech, safe spaces, and “trigger-words” have reignited a centuries-old debate 
about political expression and censorship. Many private universities have taken steps to ban hate 
speech on their campuses, and a new debate has arisen as to what Americans ought to value more: 
the right to free speech or the right of people to be free from threatening or offensive speech. 
Students protesting unpopular lecturers on college campuses have made headlines across the 
country. On the federal level, President Donald Trump ran parts of his campaign targeting 
“political correctness”, and he has addressed the issue of freedom of speech frequently as president. 
In August of 2017, the U.S. Congresses’ House Committee on Government Oversight and Reform 
held a hearing on the threat to free speech on college campuses (Friedersdorf 2017).  
This study is an attempt to develop an understanding of public opinion on many of these 
different issues by asking this question: What factors explain public opinion on free speech among 
college students? This paper attempts to analyze the relationship between an array of variables and 
opinion on free speech. To accomplish this, the results of a survey of students at Susquehanna 
University is used to identify the factors that have a significant influence on shaping a person’s 
conception of free speech. Ultimately, the goal of this paper is to discover why American college 
students feel certain ways about issues of freedom of speech as a means of helping to better 





America’s founders included free speech and free expression as an amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution for a reason. Free speech and free expression, specifically the protection of dissenting 
opinions against a regime in power, is paramount to a functioning democracy. Many important 
scholars and philosophers note the importance of free speech. Thomas Emerson identifies four 
important purposes served by the First Amendment, including that it allows for individual self-
fulfillment, promotes the advancement of knowledge, ensures a platform for full participation in 
the political decision-making process, and promotes a more adaptable and stable community 
(Emerson 1971). Still, free speech is not and has hardly ever been considered an absolute right. 
The First Amendment has seen its fair share of debate throughout American history.  
A right protected by law in the First Amendment of the U.S. constitution, many consider 
freedom of speech to be a cornerstone of American Democracy. While the First Amendment 
clearly states that the right to exercise free speech shall not be abridged, there are certain exceptions 
that do and ought to exist. The classic example of a restriction on speech in America is the opinion 
written by Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in 1919 in which he argues that it is not 
okay for someone to incite panic by "shouting fire in a crowded theater" (Schenck v. U.S., 1919).  
Other forms of abusive speech, such as harassment and slander, are prohibited by U.S. law. The 
point in giving these examples is to note that the legal right to free speech is not absolute. There 
are, albeit to a small degree, some limitations on speech that exist under U.S. law.  
The wording of the U.S. Constitution would suggest that in 1789 free speech existed in its 
purest form in American history. This idea is far from true considering the select amount of people 
the Bill of Rights applied to at the time; African-Americans and women were not fully protected 
by the law. Even amongst white males, freedom of speech has historically faced challenges in 
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America. In 1798, President John Adams and the Federalist Congress enacted the Alien and 
Sedition Acts, prohibiting false speech and dissent against the U.S. government. During the Civil 
War and Reconstruction, both in the South and in the North, laws were enacted limiting speech 
against government policies. During World War I, the Espionage Act and Sedition Act made it 
illegal to voice opinion against military conscription and the U.S. government.   
The U.S. Courts tackled many different cases involving free speech throughout the 
twentieth century. Among these include Abrams v. U.S. (1919), in which there was a ban placed 
against anti-war propaganda during World War I. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942), 
“fighting words” or direct threats were deemed not to be protected under the First Amendment. In 
U.S. v. O’Brien (1968), it was ruled that burning draft cards as a form of protest was not protected 
by the First Amendment. In Tinker v. Des Moines (1969), the Court held that First Amendment 
rights extended to students in public schools. In Brandenberg v. Ohio (1969), the Court ruled that 
inflammatory speech was legal unless it incited direct violence. These are only a handful of 
decisions relating to the First Amendment that were issued by the U.S. Supreme Court throughout 
the twentieth century. Altogether, First Amendment rights have continuously been a contentious 
issue in America.      
Given the current political climate in the United States, many have begun to reconsider the 
forms of speech that should be limited. Particularly on college campuses in America, there have 
been demands for limits on different forms of "hate speech" (Shapiro 2017; Oehmke 2017). Indeed, 
one of America’s largest challenges regarding the First Amendment involves balancing a tradition 
of free speech with a desire to protect the dignity of individuals and groups from inflammatory 
speech. Should a society that values both the right to free expression and safety outlaw racist or 
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bigoted speech because it offends or threatens certain groups of people?  
While the term hate speech is often used to define offensive speech directed towards 
particular groups, other terms that have been associated with hate speech include group defamation 
and libel. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942) the Court ruled that certain forms of speech 
have less value than others when it comes to First Amendment protections. The majority opinion 
named “fighting words” as one of the forms of speech that has particularly low value. Speech that 
incites others to fight or that directly threatens has relatively little constitutional value. This ruling 
was significant because it effectively formed the standard for judging whether certain forms of 
speech are constitutional: the government can only prohibit speech that constitutes immediate 
danger.  
Under U.S. law, a person could legally say “I hate all people with blue eyes”, but they 
could not legally say “I have devised a plan to kill all people with blue eyes and I am going to act 
on it tomorrow”. Nonetheless, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire would serve as precedent for 
Beauharnais v. Illinois (1952), effectively the first Supreme Court case dealing with hate speech 
specifically. Beauharnais was the president of a radical white supremacist group called the “White 
Circle League”. He distributed leaflets encouraging white people in the Chicago Area to halt the 
invasion of white neighborhoods by “the Negro”. The leaflets further described alleged grievances 
committed by black people and called for whites to unite against black people so as to avoid 
becoming “mongrelized”. Beauharnais was convicted by an Illinois law that prohibited the 
distribution of publications portraying “depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue” of any 
group of citizens. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld this conviction, arguing that libelous statements 
are not protected by the First Amendment; and so it became irrelevant that his speech did not create 
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a clear and present danger. This decision that seems to outlaw hate speech did not last long. In 
New York Times v. Sullivan (1964), the Court ruled that libelous statements that were not based on 
fact would have to show malice. The Court argued that even false statements must be protected if 
free expression is to survive (Volokh 2015).   
In 1992, the Court again addressed the issue of hate speech in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul. A 
man was punished under a statute in St. Paul which prohibited “fighting words” aimed against 
religions, races, creeds, or genders for burning a cross on the lawn of a black family. The Court 
found this statute to be unconstitutional based on the argument that the government could outlaw 
fighting words, but only insofar as they apply generally and not to any specific groups. In other 
words, the specific protection that the law provided for words used against certain 
races/religions/genders is what was deemed unconstitutional. Libel can exist as a general statute, 
but it cannot favor any groups. In this decision, the Court effectively reaffirmed that hate speech 
is protected by the First Amendment. In summary,  
just as the government cannot constitutionally restrict advocacy of communism, agitation 
against an on-going war, burning of the American flag, or the expression of ideas that 
deeply offend others, so too is it foreclosed from restricting speech that insults or degrades 
particular racial, religious, ethnic or gender groups (Stone 1994). 
 
Today, public opinion is certainly evolving regarding the legality of hate speech. Beyond 
calls for limits on hate speech, other debates regarding free speech have been especially prevalent 
in America. One of these debates involves limits placed on freedom of speech by private 
universities. Another debate has centered on disrespect towards the American flag. Even the 
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decades-old debate about flag-burning is somewhat of a hot topic in America right now, with then 
president-elect Donald Trump tweeting on November 29, 2016 "Nobody should be allowed to 
burn the American flag - if they do, there must be consequences - perhaps loss of citizenship or 
year in jail!". Free speech is and always has been a topic of the American conversation, and it is 
no doubt useful to attempt to understand public opinion on such an important topic.  
Defining Freedom of Speech 
It is particularly difficult to define “freedom of speech”. Free speech is an abstract idea that 
exists in many forms. Moreover, any definition of freedom of speech is subject to the realm of 
human affairs in question. In other words, free speech has a different context in different realms 
of life. It can be said to have a philosophical definition, a legal definition, an institutional definition, 
and even a personal definition.  
The philosophical definition of free speech can be said to include the entirety of human 
thought. Freedom of speech in its purest philosophical form encompasses everything that humans 
can possibly say or express. This is not to say that people ought to be permitted to whatever they 
want in any given situation, but rather that the idea of free speech is defined as someone being able 
to do just that. People can say anything they would like at any time, whether or not they will face 
ramifications for those words is where debate starts.  
The legal definition of free speech is very different from its philosophical definition. 
Additionally, this legal definition varies among different jurisdictions. Many countries that 
prosecute political dissent claim that its citizens have freedom of speech. This makes the legal 
conception of free speech particularly hard to define. If a universal legal definition for free speech 
could be agreed upon, there would hardly be any need to debate the subject. Even the U.S. Supreme 
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Court has failed to develop a coherent theory of free speech in two hundred plus years (Redish 
1982). Nonetheless, it is still useful to attempt to define the basis for free speech laws. Why do 
countries protect free speech? Why do they claim to protect free speech even when they do not? 
The answer to both questions is rooted in philosophy.  
  Institutional free speech relates to private entities. While certain forms of speech are 
protected by or prohibited by law, many private businesses, organizations, and universities might 
apply their own standards of speech for members. For example, a private university reserves the 
right to discipline its members for expressing certain forms of speech. The distinction between 
public and private institutions is particularly relevant to this study. Public institutions, including 
public universities, are subject to uphold First Amendment protections for its members. Private 
institutions are not required to do so. Many express their desire to promote free speech and 
expression, and many others are committed to maintaining a safe environment for members by 
prohibiting certain forms of hateful speech and expression. Nonetheless, the differentiation 
between free speech as it is understood both legally and institutionally likely affects the way people 
feel about what types of speech should be allowed under law as opposed to what should be allowed 
by private institutions.  
Literature Review 
It is commonly stated that freedom of speech in America is “under threat” today. Many 
well-known outspoken critics on the right, such as Ben Shapiro and others, have made this claim 
(Shapiro 2017). Do Americans today lack a respect for free speech that they once held in the past? 
To understand this question, it is important to examine public opinion on freedom of speech in 
America prior to the “PC era”. In 1970, Hazel Erksine analyzed a collection of public opinion polls 
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on free speech from 1936 through 1970. Erksine found that belief in free speech rights for any 
kind of radicals or extremists declined considerably from before 1950 until 1970 (Erksine 1970). 
Before 1950, nearly half of Americans polled believed in free speech for extremists. From 1950 to 
1960, that statistic dropped to twenty-nine percent. From 1960-1970, only twenty one percent 
believed in free speech for extremists. Erksine notes that the political events of the time that put a 
spotlight on free speech, including World War II, the Cold War and McCarthyism, and the Vietnam 
War. It can be argued that it is misguiding to make the assertion that free speech is somehow 
“under threat” today as opposed to any other time in American history  
Political Tolerance 
The classic variable used to quantify opinions on the extensions of civil liberties to others 
is political tolerance. Political tolerance can be defined as the willingness to extend democratic 
rights to disliked ideological groups (Rohrschneider 1999). People who are politically tolerant are 
more likely to be accepting of ideologies that contradict their own belief system.  
There does seem to be a sort of paradox that exists between a person’s belief in freedom of 
speech and the degree to which he is willing to apply those beliefs to opposing viewpoints (Pujol 
2016; Teresa 2012). A poll conducted by the Pew Research Center across thirty-eight different 
countries in 2015 demonstrates this paradox. When asked if they believe in the principle of free 
speech, an overwhelming majority of respondents in the United States and in the rest of the world 
answered yes. However, when more specific examples were given to respondents, such as 
instances of anti-governmental rhetoric or offensive hate speech, the percentage of people who 
said these forms of speech should be protected was substantially lower (Wike and Simmons 2015).  
One of the earliest scholars in the field of political tolerance, Samuel A. Stouffer, found a 
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strong relationship between a variety of variables and tolerance (Stouffer 1955). Bobo and Licari 
(1989) summarize Stouffer’s findings: “Stouffer (1955) found that tolerance was higher 
among…those perceiving little threat from the target group…men as opposed to women…and the 
highly educated more than those with less education” (Bobo and Licari 1989). While political 
tolerance typically is meant to include more than just a willingness to extend speech protections to 
disliked groups, it is likely that many of these same variables similarly affect opinions on the 
regulation of speech. Since Stouffer’s early research, many of his initial findings have continued 
to be supported. Additionally, an individual’s perception of the threat posed by certain groups has 
consistently been found to relate to tolerance (Davis & Silver 2004; Gibson 1987). In fact, Davis 
& Silver  argue that “if any single factor is likely to drive people to cede civil liberties for security 
it is threat” (2004, 30).  
Political Sophistication, Political Interest, and Support for Free Speech 
Factors that have been said to influence political tolerance are education and cognition. 
Many have found that the effects of education on political tolerance are profound (Stauffer, 1955; 
Bobo and Licari, 1989; Davis & Silver, 2004).  
A common measure of cognition, more specifically political knowledge, is political 
sophistication. Understanding the psychology of political thought is no doubt crucial to 
understanding the way in which people conceptualize free speech. Even more so, a person’s 
political perceptions are likely to influence their opinion of free speech. A person’s collective 
political cognitions are commonly known as his Political Belief System (PBS) (Luskin 1987). A 
person’s PBS is composed of various dimensions. Three can be used to define political 
sophistication. First is size, or the pure amount of information a PBS is exposed to. Second is 
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range, or the variety and scope of information a PBS is exposed to (narrow vs. wide-ranging). 
Third is organization, or the extent to which cognitions are interconnected (Luskin 1987). This 
third aspect determines not just how politically aware a person is, but also the way in which they 
cognitively process political information. Is a particular ideology consistently applied when 
interpreting political information? Or are opinions formed based on groupthink and an influence 
from outside sources?   
Altogether, these dimensions of a PBS determine the degree to which a person is politically 
sophisticated. That is to say that a person with a wide-ranging but organized PBS is more 
politically sophisticated. It is important to note that a person can be politically sophisticated 
without labeling themselves as part of a larger political group (Republican/Democrat) and can still 
be unsophisticated if they do use labels to define their political beliefs (Luskin 1987). People within 
the mass-public conceptualize politics in different ways, and all have different degrees of political 
sophistication. Some people are satisfied with receiving their news only from major media outlets 
and are quick to make political judgments based on group-based political thinking. Others expose 
themselves to significantly more political information and tend to think about things from an 
ideological perspective. There are different factors that explain why this is this case. One of these 
variables is education and political knowledge, which is said to have a profound effect on the way 
that individuals conceptualize candidates and parties in an election (Lewis-Beck 2008). There is a 
general consensus among scholars that the best way to measure political sophistication is by testing 
an individual’s factual knowledge of American politics (Lewis-Beck 2008). To measure this, 
questions relating to political facts can be used in which respondents are quizzed on their political 




Notably, many studies have found that liberals are more likely to tolerate disliked speech 
than conservatives (McClosky & Brill 1983; Davis & Silver 2004; Linder and Nosek, 2009). There 
is no widely-agreed upon method of measuring political affiliation or party preference in political 
science (Kroh 2007). There are several different methods of this measurement commonly used. 
Typically, some type of scale is used to measure an individual’s political affiliation. For example, 
two-point scales where subjects label themselves as either liberal/conservative or 
Republican/Democrat are often used. To achieve more a more accurate representation of an 
individual’s political affiliation, larger scales can be employed. Examples include five-point scales 
(ranging from liberal, lean more towards liberal, neutral, lean more towards conservative, 
conservative), and eleven-point scales. It is important to note that different scales produce different 
results (Kroh 2007). Research specific to political tolerance sometimes measures political 
affiliation on a seven-point scale (Linder and Nosek, 2009).    
Free Speech on College Campuses 
There have been a few notable studies undertaken on public opinion of free speech on 
college campuses. The most notable research in recent years conducted in this field was completed 
by the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation along with the Newseum Institute. The 
organizations partnered to complete a representative survey of college students in America and 
their opinions on free speech. A survey of adults in the U.S. not in college served as a comparison. 
The findings of this research were somewhat surprising. Of U.S. college students, freedom of the 
press (81% of students), freedom to petition the government (76% of students) and freedom of 
speech (73% of students) are all rights perceived as secure. The majority of U.S. adults do believe 
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these rights are secure, but not to the same degree that college students do. For freedom of speech, 
only 56% of U.S. adults believe it is secure; for freedom of the press, 64% of adults believe it is 
secure; and for freedom to petition the government, 58% believe it is secure. The researchers found 
that race is significantly related to perceptions concerning freedom of assembly, “Non-Hispanic 
black college students are much less likely than non-Hispanic white college students to believe the 
right of people to assemble peacefully is secure, at 39% vs. 70%, respectively”. Additionally, the 
poll found that “Adults are far more likely to perceive a decline in free speech rights, with 40% 
saying the ability to exercise free speech is weaker today than 20 years ago, compared with 22% 
of college students saying the same” (“Free Expression on Campus” 2015).  
A poll conducted by Rasmussen in 2017 found 85 percent of Americans agreeing that 
ensuring freedom of speech is more important than ensuring no one is offended by what others 
say. Seventy-three percent of Americans said they would be willing to die for their right to free 
speech. However, only 28 percent of respondents believe that they have true freedom of speech 
today. Contrary to most other findings in the field of political tolerance, it is noted that free speech 
is rarely a partisan or racial issue. That is to say that regardless of political affiliation or race, 
Americans are likely to support free speech. However, in the Rasmussen poll it is noted that men 
were more likely to support free speech than woman (“73% Say Freedom” 2017).  
 In attempting to understand current public opinion of freedom of speech on college 
campuses, few scholars have attributed any explanatory variables. Some note the degree to which 
intellectual diversity is welcomed by a particular campus as having an effect on the opinions of 
students (Epstein 2017). Others note demographic factors such as race (“Free Expression on 
Campus” 2016). Most research that has been conducted has been comparative, whether that be 
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comparing opinion on free speech across countries or across universities or across a range of ages. 
There has been little research explaining why it is that students in particular think certain ways 
about free speech.  
Methodology/theory 
The goal of this study is to answer this question: What factors explain public opinion on 
free speech among college students? To test the relationship between a variety of variables and 
opinion on freedom of speech, I created a survey and distributed it to students currently attending 
Susquehanna University. The survey was distributed to all students currently listed in the 
Susquehanna University student directory via email. Respondents were given two weeks to 
complete the survey. There were 522 respondents that fully completed the survey out of 2404 
students (22%). Responses were coded in preparation for statistical analysis. I used the results from 
the survey to produce independent variables, control variables, and dependent variables.  
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable of this study is opinion on free speech, which is more specifically 
defined as the degree to which a person wishes to regulate speech. As previously mentioned, there 
are legal limits on speech that exist in the United States. Given, there is not so much a question of 
“if legal limits should be placed on speech?” Rather, debate focuses on the question “what legal 
limits should be placed on speech?” It would not make much sense to define the dependent variable 
of this study as “support for free speech” because hardly anyone supports absolute speech in its 
purest form, and because hardly ever has free speech existed in its purest form under law. When 
this topic is studied, the opinions that are sought are best described as opinions on the regulation 
of speech.  
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To measure opinions on the regulation of speech, I created multiple indexes using data 
from the survey. A range of questions were asked in a yes/no format. Respondents were presented 
with multiple scenarios in which their answer would reflect an indication of support for more 
regulation of speech or support for less regulation of speech. In total, fifteen questions from the 
survey contributed to the data for my dependent variables. All fifteen of these questions were asked 
in a yes/no format. When coding the responses to these questions, answers that signified support 
for less regulation of speech in the given scenario were assigned a 1. Answers that signified support 
for more regulation of speech were assigned a 0. To test the different ways that students 
conceptualize speech in public life as opposed to speech on campus, I created three primary 
indexes. The first index (index 1) combined results from questions relating to legal regulations on 
speech. Table 1 includes the results from a question used to create index 1.  
 
 






# Answer % Count 
1 Yes 55.58% 289 
0 No 44.42% 231 
 Total 100% 520 
 
For example, if a person answered “Yes, flag burning should be legal”, then his response would 
be coded as a 1. If he answered “No, flag burning should be illegal”, then his response would be 
coded as a 0. It is important to note that in not all questions was the answer “yes” synonymous 
with support for less regulation of speech. Each question was unique in its phrasing, but all coded 
responses of 1 indicate support for less regulation of speech while responses of 0 indicate support 
for more regulation of speech. Note that this question asks students whether a certain form of 
political expression ought to be legal or not. Index 1 is composed of nine questions: Q29, Q31, 
Q34, Q35, Q37, Q38, Q40, Q42, and Q48 (see appendix). Contrastingly, table 2 includes the results 
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from a question used to create the second index (index 2).  
Table 2: Q30 - Assuming that he/she is not breaking any rules in regards to starting a fire, 
should a Susquehanna student be allowed to burn an American flag on campus? 
 
 
# Answer % Count 
1 Yes 33.40% 175 
0 No 66.60% 349 
 Total 100% 524 
 
Whereas Q29 asks about whether or not flag burning ought to be legal, Q30 asks whether or not 
flag burning ought to be allowed on campus. This distinction is what separates index 1 from index 
2. All questions used to compose index 2 relate to the regulation of speech on campus. This index 
is composed of six questions: Q25, Q30, Q32, Q33, Q36, Q45 (see appendix).  
 The third primary index created is simply a combination of index 1 and index 2. All of the 
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responses used to create index 1 and index 2 are put together in a third index (index 3). In 
mathematical terms: index 1 + index 2 = index 3. Likewise, index 3 is composed of the results 
from fifteen questions: Q29, Q31, Q34, Q35, Q37, Q38, Q40, Q42, Q25, Q30, Q32, Q33, Q36, 
Q45, and Q48 (see appendix).  
 In addition to these three primary indexes, I also created several other secondary indexes 
to test the way respondents feel about regulating specific forms of speech. Indexes 1 and 2 included 
questions on a variety of topics relating to the regulation of speech. Contrarily, these secondary 
indexes combine results from questions all similar in nature. There is a flag burning index, a 
Confederate flag display index, a Nazi speech index, and a political regulation index. Most of the 
indexes are self-explanatory. The flag burning index consists of all questions in the survey relating 
to flag burning: the results from Q29 and Q30. The Confederate flag display index consists of 
results from questions relating to the display of confederate flags: Q31 and Q32. The Nazi Speech 
index is composed of results from questions relating to the regulation of speech that supports 
Nazism: Q33, Q34, and Q35. Lastly, the political regulation index includes results from questions 
relating to the regulation of opposition to a government regime in power: Q40, Q42, Q43, and 
Q44.  
Independent Variables/Hypotheses 
 Given the existing literature on political tolerance and the various polls that have been 
distributed in the United States in recent years, there were several variables initially hypothesized 
to have a significant impact on opinions relating to the regulation of speech. These variables are 
political affiliation, gender, education/political sophistication, interest in politics, and the 
perceived threat of radical ideologies. Each variable was coded in such a way that it could be used 
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for statistical analysis. 
Hypothesis 1: Democrats are more likely to support less regulation of speech than 
Republicans. 
Literature on political affiliation suggests that either Democrats are more politically 
tolerant than Republicans. Political affiliation was coded so that each respondent was assigned a 
value on a scale of 1 to 7 that reflected each individual’s political affiliation. Respondents were 
first asked whether they identify as a Republican, Democrat, or Independent (Q1). Depending on 
their response, they were directed to another question. For example, respondents who said they 
were a Republican were directed to a question that asked if they consider themselves a strong 
Republican or a not strong Republican (Q2). Respondents who answered Democrat were prompted 
to answer whether they consider themselves strong or not strong Democrats (Q3). Respondents 
who answered Independent were directed to a question that asked if they lean more to the right, 
lean more to the left, or are neutral (Q4). Combining data from these four questions, respondents 
who answered that they were a strong Republican were assigned a value of 1, weak Republicans a 
value of 2, Independents that lean more to the right a value of 3, Independents that are neutral a 
value of 4, Independents that lean more to left a value of 5, weak Democrats a value of 6, and 
strong Democrats a value of 7.  
Hypothesis 2: Men are more likely to support less regulation of speech than women.  
Most literature suggests that men support less regulation of speech than women. Likewise, 
it was hypothesized that the results of this survey would suggest the same. Gender is measured in 
the form of a dummy variable, females were assigned a value of 0 and males a value of 1 (Q15).  
Hypothesis 3: Those with more education are likely to support less regulation of speech 
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than those with less education.  
Literature suggests that the highly educated support less regulation of speech than those 
less educated. To measure an individual’s level of education, two variables are used. The first is 
structural, measuring the amount of time spent in college. College freshmen are assigned a value 
of 1, sophomores a value of 2, juniors a value of 3, and seniors a value of 4 (Q16). It was 
hypothesized that students who have been in college longer would support less regulation of 
speech than those who had not been in college as long. The second variable used to measure 
education was political sophistication.  
Hypothesis 4: People with higher levels of political sophistication are more likely to 
support less regulation of speech than those with lower levels of political sophistication. 
To quantify this variable, three questions were given to respondents in a quiz-like format (Q11, 
Q12, Q13). Each question is factual and has right and wrong answers. For each question answered 
correctly, respondents were awarded “1 point” towards their political sophistication value. 
Combining the results from these three questions, each respondent’s political sophistication value 
varied from 0 to 3. A value of 3 indicating high political sophistication, a value of 0 indicating low 
political sophistication.  
Hypothesis 5: People who are more politically interested are more likely to support less 
regulation of speech than those who are less politically interested.  
Literature on education’s relationship with political tolerance also suggests that those who 
have a high interest in politics might be more politically tolerant. Political interest was measured 
on a scale of 1-10, with 10 indicating a respondent has high interest in politics, and 1 indicating a 
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low interest in politics (Q5). The survey question used to measure this variable was open-ended, 
so respondents identified their own political interest.  
Hypothesis 6: People who perceive extreme ideologies to be less of a threat are more likely 
to support less regulation of speech than those who perceive extremist ideologies to be 
more of a threat.  
To measure the effect that an individual’s perception of radical ideologies has on his 
opinion on the regulation of speech, two different variables were created. The second variable used 
to quantify perception was an individual’s perception of the threat of racist ideologies. 
Respondents were asked to grade the degree to which they view racism as a threat (Q27). This 
perception was quantified on a 1-5 scale. Responses of 1 indicate that the respondent perceives 
racism as a severe threat, 2 a major threat, 3 a moderate threat, 4 a minor threat, and 5 not much 
of a threat. That is to say that respondents who received a value of 1 believe that racism is a more 
severe threat than respondents with a value of 5. The third variable used to quantify perception 
was an individual’s perception of radical ideologies. Respondents were asked how much of a threat 
they perceive radical political ideologies to be (Q26). The responses to this question were 
quantified in the same manner as Q27, on a 1-5 scale with a value of 1 indicating the belief that 
radical ideologies are a severe threat and a value of 0 indicating the belief that radical ideologies 
are not much of a threat.  
Hypothesis 7: People who have not been a victim of derogatory speech are more likely to 
 support less regulation of speech than those have been a victim of derogatory speech.  
 
Respondent were asked to indicate their status as a victim: whether they had or had not 
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been victims of derogatory speech in the past (Q41). Respondents who indicated they had been a 
victim in the past were assigned a value of 0, those who had not been a victim in the past were 
assigned a score of 1.  
Results/Analysis 
To test each hypothesis, a variety of statistical models were used to analyze data. Multiple 
linear regressions were run on index 1 and index 3. Index 2 had a smaller collection of questions, 
so an ordered logit was instead used to analyze it. Table 3 is meant to serve as the primary model 
of this study: it measures the relationship between all independent variables and overall opinions 
regarding the regulation of speech.    
Table 3: Opinions on the Regulation of Speech 
*Denotes significance at the .10 level, ** at the .05 level, and *** at the .01 level 























































































Race    -.111 
(.124) 
Religion     .083 
(.051) 




   .237 
(.208) 










Observations 506 509 499 483 




-828.57935                     
Pseudo R2=     
0.0586 
LR chi2(8) = 
103.15  
.2376  .2548 
 
 In table 3, model 1 is a linear regression run with the primary independent variables of this 
study on index 1. Model 2 is an ordered logit run on index 2. Model 3 is a regression run on index 
3. Model 4 is a regression run on index 4 including the primary variables of this study when 
controlling for race, religion, the perceived political ideology of Susquehanna’s faculty, the 
perceived political ideology of Susquehanna’s student body, and respondents’ comfort level when 
expressing their opinions in classes at Susquehanna University.  
Political affiliation is significant and negative across all models. These findings are the 
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opposite of what was predicted in hypothesis 1. This suggests that respondents who had a higher 
value on the political affiliation scale (closer to Democrat) support more regulation on speech than 
those who had lower values on the political affiliation scale. The significance and direction of this 
variable across all models would suggest that this holds true for the regulation of speech legally 
(index 1), on campus (index 2), and in both combined (index 3).  
Political interest is significant and positive across all models. This would suggest that 
respondents who reported a higher interest in politics support less regulation of speech than those 
who reported low interest in politics. Again, this holds true for index 1, index 2, and index 3. These 
findings support Hypothesis 5. It is not surprising that students who demonstrate a high interest in 
politics also support less regulation of speech.   
Political sophistication is positive and significant in model 1, model 3, and model 4. It is 
not significant in model 2. This would suggest that students who are more politically sophisticated 
support less regulation of speech than those who are less politically sophisticated except for issues 
relating to speech on campus. These findings support hypothesis 4. 
Gender is positive and significant across all models. This suggests that males support less 
regulation on speech than females do both in terms of speech that ought to be legal and speech on 
campus. These findings support existing research and hypothesis 2. 
A respondent’s status as a victim of derogatory speech is negative across all models and 
significant in models 2 and 3. This suggests that respondents who have not been victims of 
derogatory speech support more regulation on speech than those who have been victims of 
derogatory speech. These findings contradict hypothesis 7.  
A respondent’s perception of the threat posed by radical ideologies is insignificant across 
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all models. This does not support hypothesis 6. Contrastingly, a respondent’s perception of the 
threat posed by racism is positive and significant across all models. This would suggest that 
respondents who perceive racism to be less of a threat support less regulation on speech than those 
who perceive racism to be more of a threat. These findings supports hypothesis 6.  
A student’s class year is significant and positive across all models. This supports hypothesis 
3. In other words, seniors support less regulation of speech than underclassmen. This also supports 
the idea that those with more education support less regulation of speech than those who have less 
education.  
Most of the independent variables show significance across all models. The only variable 
with no significance across any model is the perceived threat of radical ideologies.  
Table 4 shows the results of an ordered logit run on the flag burning index. When it comes 
to the issue of flag burning, political affiliation is still significant. However, the direction of its 
coefficient is now positive. This suggests that respondents who are higher on the political 
affiliation scale (closer to Democrat) support less regulation of flag burning than those lower on 
the scale. Political interest, Political Sophistication, and gender are all positive and significant, 
these findings are similar to the findings in table 3. However, status as a victim, the perceived 
threat of racism, the perceived threat of radical ideologies, and class year are all insignificant in 
this model.  
Table 4: Opinions on Flag Burning 
*Denotes significance at the .10 level, ** at the .05 level, and *** at the .01 level 




Political Affiliation .217*** 
(.048) 
Political Interest .162*** 
(.038) 






Perceived Threat of Radical Ideologies -.0003 
(.094) 
Perceived Threat of Racism  -.095 
(.102) 
Class Year .068 
(.074) 
Observations 514 
 LR chi2(8)        =      79.42 
Prob > chi2       =     0.0000 




Table 5: Opinions on the Regulation of the Display of Confederate Flags 
*Denotes significance at the .10 level, ** at the .05 level, and *** at the .01 level 
 Model 6: Ordered Logit on Confederate 
Flag Display Index 
Political Affiliation  -.237*** 
(.049) 
Political Interest -.007 
(.040) 
Political Sophistication  .190 
(.148) 
Gender  .346* 
(.202) 
Victim  -.450** 
(.197) 
Perceived Threat of Radical Ideologies .112 
(.101) 
Perceived Threat of Racism  .507*** 
(.112) 





 LR chi2(8)        =     103.73 
Prob > chi2       =     0.0000 
Pseudo R2         =     0.1012 
Table 5 uses the confederate flag index as a dependent variable. The findings in Table 5 
are similar to the findings in table 3. The direction of all coefficients is the same as in table 3 with 
the exception of political interest. Political affiliation, gender, status as a victim, and the perceived 
threat of racism are all significant. Political interest, political sophistication, the perceived threat 
of radical ideologies, and class year are all insignificant.   
Table 6 measures the relationship of the independent variables with opinions on the 
regulation of pro-Nazi speech, quantified by the Nazi speech index. Again, findings related to the 
Nazi speech index do not differ much from the findings in table 3. Political affiliation and status 
as a victim are both significant and negative, while political interest, political sophistication, 
gender, and the perceived threat of racism are all significant and positive. In this model, the 
perceived threat of radical ideologies and class year are insignificant. 
Table 6: Opinions on the Regulation of pro-Nazi Speech 
*Denotes significance at the .10 level, ** at the .05 level, and *** at the .01 level 
 Model 7: Ordered Logit on Nazi Speech 
Index 




Political Interest .079** 
(.038) 
Political Sophistication  .558*** 
(.148) 
Gender  .685*** 
(.190) 
Victim  -.339* 
(.187) 
Perceived Threat of Radical Ideologies .064 
(.092) 
Perceived Threat of Racism  .441*** 
(.101) 
Class Year .091 
(.075) 
Observations 514 
 LR chi2(8)        =     119.11 
Prob > chi2       =     0.0000 
Pseudo R2         =     0.0920 
 
 Table 7 shows the results of an ordered logit with the political regulation index as the 
dependent variable. Similar to the results of table three, findings show that political affiliation is 
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significant and negative, political sophistication is significant and positive, and gender is 
significant and positive. Political interest, status as a victim, the perceived threat of radical 
ideologies, the perceived threat of racism, and class year are all insignificant.  
 
Table 7: Opinions on the Regulation of Political Opposition  
*Denotes significance at the .10 level, ** at the .05 level, and *** at the .01 level  
 Model 8: Ordered Logit on Political 
Regulation Index 
Political Affiliation  -.098** 
(.050) 
Political Interest .063 
(.039) 
Political Sophistication  .542*** 
(.138) 
Gender  .429** 
(.206) 
Victim  -.114 
(.197) 
Perceived Threat of Radical Ideologies -.040 
(.098) 




Class Year .125 
(.079) 
Observations 511 
 LR chi2(8)        =      52.75 
Prob > chi2       =     0.0000 
Pseudo R2         =     0.0513 
 
Conclusions 
The results of this study indicate that students who support less regulation on speech are 
those who identify lower on the political affiliation scale (closer to Republican), report higher 
interest in politics, have higher levels of political sophistication, who identify as male, have been 
victims of derogatory speech, view racism as less of a threat, and have been in school longer.  
Political affiliation has a significant and negative relationship with opinions on the 
regulation of speech across almost all models. With the exception of the flag burning index, this 
result is the opposite of Hypothesis 1 and the opposite of what is suggested by existing literature. 
An explanation for this might be that most of the relevant literature suggesting Democrats support 
less regulation of speech than Republicans is outdated. It can be argued that there has been 
somewhat of a shift in the ideology of both political parties in recent years when it comes to 
numerous social issues and the issue of political correctness. Perhaps the findings in this study can 
be somewhat explained by this supposed shift. Another explanation for these findings might be a 
difference within certain political affiliations dependent on age. Perhaps college-aged Democrats 
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and Republicans think differently about speech than older Democrats and Republicans. Further 
comparative research would certainly be useful to test the relationship between age, political 
affiliation, and opinions on speech. One more possible explanation for the findings is that this 
variable may be misrepresentative of true political affiliation. There are more political parties that 
exist than Republican, Democrat, and Independent. The method used to measure Political 
Affiliation in this study was used so that it could be quantified efficiently, but it is important to 
recognize the possible error that can occur as a result of the limited possible choices. It is also 
possible that questions used to generate the dependent variables were biased in a way that favored 
right-winged ideology. The findings in Model 5 using the flag burning index as the dependent 
variable support this idea. While questions were selected to limit this possible bias, it may still be 
present.  
The significance and negative direction of the Victim variable across most models is 
surprising. It is hard to believe that those who have been victimized are more likely to support less 
regulation on speech than those who have not been victimized by derogatory speech. It is possible 
that the question used to quantify this variable was too broad. Respondents were asked whether 
they had ever been a victim of derogatory speech on the basis of race, religion, gender, or sexual 
orientation (Q41). A majority of respondents answered that they had been victims. It would be 
interesting to see how the results would change if this question was instead divided. For example, 
if the survey asked, “Have you ever been a victim of derogatory speech because of your race?” 
And then asked separately if the same had been true because of religion. Differentiating between 
different types of victims would likely have yielded very different results. Perhaps it is also 
possible that people who belong to minority groups might be more understanding of the need to 
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protect individual freedoms because they themselves fear a loss of freedoms (Gibson 1987). It 
might follow that being a member of a minority group correlates with having been a victim of 
derogatory speech. If that is the case, it is possible that victims of derogatory speech actually do 
support less regulation of speech than non-victims. Further research is needed to test this theory.  
The findings related to hypothesis 3 are particularly interesting. Students who are further 
along their college careers support less regulation of speech across half of the models. This 
supports the idea that people with more education are more politically tolerant than those with less 
education. In some capacity, it simultaneously rejects the notion that colleges and universities are 
responsible for corrupting their students and jeopardizing the American ideal of free speech. Given 
the limited data in this analysis, this cannot be said to be true for all universities in America, but it 
can be said to hold true at least somewhat for Susquehanna University. Consider the responses to 
Q20. A majority (59.08%) of Susquehanna students perceive Susquehanna’s faculty to be 
generally liberal. Still, students who have spent more time at Susquehanna support less regulation 
of speech than those who have spent less time at the University. It would appear that the claim by 
many on the right that free speech is under threat and that colleges and universities are to blame is 
ill-founded when it comes to Susquehanna University. This analysis is purely theoretical. Further 
evidence is needed to test this theory, and it would be interesting to see if the findings in this study 
would also apply to institutions across the country.  
There is no evidence that suggests an individual’s perception of the threat that radical 
ideologies pose has any effect on opinion regarding the regulation of speech. Contrastingly, the 
strong significance associated with the perceived threat of racism suggests that perception does 
play a role in shaping a student’s beliefs on speech. The difficulty lies in identifying the different 
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forms of perception that contribute to opinion. Perception of racism appears to be one of these 
forms. Further research differentiating between perception of different groups and ideologies 
would undoubtedly be useful.  
The findings related to political sophistication’s effect on student’s opinion of speech 
supports hypothesis 4 and existing literature. Those who are more politically sophisticated tend to 
support less regulation of speech than those who are less politically sophisticated. It is noted that 
this variable was not significant when running an ordered logit on index 2. Perhaps political 
sophistication plays a minimal role in determining how students feel about what forms of speech 
should be permitted on campus. This finding makes sense considering there are no scenarios in 
questions used to create index 2 involve no legal ramifications for different forms of speech. 
Students who are politically sophisticated may have a better understanding of the differentiation 
between free speech as it applies to public life versus life on campus. 
The principle of Free speech is a crucial part of the American identity. Public opinion 
indicates the way in which citizens perceive this principle. It is no doubt important to understand 
what affects opinion on this part of America’s identity. America’s overall conception of free 
speech and understanding the factors that affect it is vital in developing the centuries old debate 
surrounding the First Amendment. Further research on this topic will be useful in contributing to 
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